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CURTIS BROWN AND STEVEN LUPER-FOY 
BELIEF AND RATIONALITY 
We have gathered here a collection of papers at a point of intersection 
between epistemology and the philosophy of mind. The essays in this 
collection illuminate the bearing of issues about rationality on a variety 
of themes about belief, including the relation of belief to other proposi 
tional attitudes, the nature of the subjects who have beliefs, the nature 
of the objects of belief, and the ways in which we attribute content to 
beliefs. 
For example, Richard Foley, in his contribution, defends a general 
view about the nature of rationality which, he argues, applies to belief 
as a special case.1 According to his general conception, a decision, 
plan, goal, belief, etc., is rational if, roughly speaking, it will apparently 
satisfy the agent's goals. This suggests that there might be good reasons 
for belief which are nevertheless not reasons to think that the proposi 
tion believed is true, since believing what is true is only one among 
many goals we have, and believing what is false, or anyway that for 
which we lack adequate evidence, may be a way of satisfying some of 
our other goals. Foley agrees that good reasons for belief need not be 
reasons to think the belief true, but argues that the consequences of 
this view are less radical than they might seem; in general, believing 
that for which we have the best evidence is the best way to win the 
pragmatic benefits which might result from holding a particular belief. 
In many cases in which it might seem beneficial to believe something 
for which one has inadequate evidence, Foley contends, the pragmatic 
benefits in question can be gained by epistemic attitudes of acceptance 
that fall short of belief, such as, presupposing or hypothesizing the 
truth of the proposition in question rather than believing that proposi 
tion. Thus, Foley's epistemological view has implications for the philos 
ophy of mind, since his notion of rationality requires a sharp distinction 
in the philosophy of mind between belief and acceptance. 
Conceptions of rationality also relate in various ways to views about 
the content of belief. On some views rationality consists in part of 
procedures one ought to follow when one discovers that one has a 
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belief that cannot possibly be true.2 Such a view of rationality would 
not fit well with an account of the objects of the attitudes according to 
which one simply could not believe the impossible. (Perhaps one could 
simply shift to procedures for dealing with conflicting beliefs. But on 
some views of the attitudes, even genuinely conflicting beliefs are im 
possible.3) Also, a related point, such a view clashes with accounts 
according to which one automatically and inevitably believes all the 
necessary consequences of things one believes, since in that case one 
who believed something impossible would thereby believe everything, 
and it is hard to see what epistemological principles would help to 
correct that situation. If believing the impossible merely led to believing 
everything, one might envision a principle for eliminating beliefs which 
erupt in explosions of further beliefs. But such a principle will be of 
little use if to believe something impossible just is to believe everything. 
And some influential views about the objects of belief appear to have 
just such consequences. For example, as Stalnaker notes at the begin 
ning of his contribution, epistemic and doxastic logics have been mod 
eled on modal logic, with belief taken to be analogous to necessity. 
Epistemic logics have tended to mirror normal modal logics in the 
following respect: just as, if Q is a deductive consequence of P, then 
"Necessarily g" is a deductive consequence of "Necessarily P", so if 
g is a deductive consequence of P, then "S knows g" or "5 believes 
g" is taken to be a deductive consequence of "S knows P" or "S 
believes P". Such logics thus have the consequence that one knows or 
believes all the deductive consequences of things one knows or believes. 
It is worth adding that something very similar to the view that one 
believes all the deductive consequences of the things one believes is 
an almost unavoidable consequence of some widely held views about 
semantics, as Scott Soames has shown.4 It seems indisputable that belief 
distributes over conjunction, that is, that if I believe that P & g, then 
I believe that P and I believe that g. Now suppose, as it is tempting 
to do, that "Ralph believes that grass is green" reports a relation 
between Ralph and the semantic content of "grass is green". Suppose 
finally that the semantic content of "grass is green" is construed as the 
set of conditions in which 
"grass is green" is true 
- for example, that 
the semantic content of 
"grass is green" is the set of possible worlds 
in which grass is green.5 The set of worlds in which grass is green is 
the same as the set of worlds in which grass is green and 29 
= 512; so, 
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if 
"Ralph believes that grass is green" is true, so is "Ralph believes 
that grass is green and 29 
= 512". But if belief distributes over conjunc 
tion, then we have the result that "Ralph believes that 29 
= 512" is 
true. The argument is perfectly general. If "Helga believes that the sky 
is blue" is true, then so are "Helga believes that either the sky is not 
colorless or all French citizens are aliens from Saturn", "Helga believes 
that the sky is not colorless and either the sky is not a solid red dot or 
it is a solid orange pumpkin", etc. If we accept the argument's premis 
ses, it shows that one believes any necessary consequence of things one 
believes. Moreover, even without the view that belief distributes over 
conjunction, we shall get the view that one believes anything necessarily 
equivalent to things one believes; as Stalnaker notes, this is already 
quite a strong view. 
But, it seems hard to deny, we do not believe all the necessary 
consequences of our beliefs; we are not logically omniscient. Logics or 
accounts of semantics according to which we are logically omniscient 
can at best be idealizations. In his paper, Stalnaker discusses the nature 
of the idealization involved. Normal logics of knowledge or belief, 
Stalnaker argues, are not best thought of as logics of the beliefs of 
hyper-rational beings; they are better thought of as applying to the 
beliefs of ordinary agents, but in a special or technical sense of 'belief. 
They apply, he suggests, to a sort of implicit belief which is not the 
ordinary sort of belief. If I believe P, then I implicitly believe anything 
implied by P, even though I may find it difficult or impossible to gain 
access to this implicit information. 
Stalnaker, then, defends an account of the logic of belief which 
implies that we believe (at least in a technical sense of the term) all 
the necessary consequences of our beliefs, despite the apparent conflict 
between this view and natural views of rationality. Similarly, but for 
different reasons, Ruth Barcan Marcus has defended the view that one 
cannot believe the impossible.6 Her reasons have to do directly with 
the relation between rationality and belief: she holds that ascribing 
belief in the impossible to a rational agent would render the agent's 
behavior indistinguishable from that of a genuinely irrational agent.7 
In his contribution to this volume, Curtis Brown defends the possibility 
of believing what is not possible against Marcus's arguments, suggesting 
that if her argument were sound it would lead to much more drastic 
consequences than she intends. But Brown adds that if there is a 
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subclass of the objects of our belief which essentially characterize our 
narrow or intrinsic mental states, Marcus's claim that we cannot believe 
the impossible will be true of them. 
Stalnaker's and Brown's papers, then, concern the relation between 
rationality and the attribution of content. So, in a very different way, 
does the paper of R. M. Sainsbury.8 One of the main problems of 
epistemology is the problem of what we are rationally justified in believ 
ing, and one of the main devices by means of which epistemologists 
have pursued this problem is the thought-experiment of the evil genius 
who produces our thoughts and experiences in such a way that our 
beliefs are radically false. The evil genius scenario has interesting con 
nections with views about the contents of the attitudes. For example, 
Hilary Putnam9 has produced an influential argument that causal views 
about the content of the attitudes render the skeptical scenario incoher 
ent. A very different argument from similar premisses to a similar 
conclusion may be found in an essay of John McDowell.10 In his contri 
bution, Sainsbury explores in detail the bearing of Russellian views of 
content, according to which content is not entirely intrinsic, on various 
skeptical possibilities. He agrees that Russellian views of content are 
incompatible with a naive version of the Cartesian skeptical scenario, 
but argues that there are more sophisticated Cartesian possibilities 
which Russellianism will not dislodge. Nevertheless, these more sophis 
ticated possibilities rely on the notion that mental states with different 
contents may be "indistinguishable from within", and Sainsbury leaves 
it an open question whether this notion is ultimately sustainable. 
Another contribution to this volume, that of Laurence BonJour, 
addresses the relation between epistemological issues and the nature of 
the objects of belief. According to BonJour, at least some elements of 
thought must have content by virtue of their intrinsic character rather 
than by virtue of their relations to other thoughts or to the outside 
world. (This is similar to Brown's claim that there are objects of belief 
which characterize one's intrinsic mental states, though BonJour's rea 
sons for the claim are different.) BonJour argues that only such a view 
can explain our introspective access to the content of our thoughts. He 
criticizes the view that the objects of thought are essentially symbolic 
or linguistic as being incompatible with such introspective access. His 
basic argument is simple: if the objects of thought are linguistic, then 
their content is not determined by their intrinsic properties but, rather, 
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in some way by the relations in which they stand, for example relations 
to the external objects by which they are caused under normal con 
ditions, or relations to the way others in the community use the same 
symbols. But these relations are not introspectively observable. So it 
would seem that content is not introspectively observable. All that is 
present to consciousness in thinking is symbols, so all that could be 
present to consciousness when one has a belief about the content of a 
particular expression is symbols.11 
BonJour rejects two possible replies to this argument. First, one 
might hold that content is not in the head and, thus, is inaccessible to 
introspection,12 so it is no objection to the linguistic view that it implies 
that content cannot be introspected. BonJour's response is that even if 
a certain dimension of content is inaccessible to introspection, many 
aspects of content are accessible. For instance, that 'water' refers to 
H20 may be inaccessible to some English speakers, but it is nevertheless 
accessible to them that water is "the locally familiar liquid that appears 
in lakes and rivers, falls from the sky at times", and so on. (BonJour 
identifies the distinction between accessible and inaccessible content 
with the distinction between "wide" and "narrow" content.) Second, 
BonJour rejects the idea that some version of "conceptual role seman 
tics" can account for the content of the language of thought in a way 
which makes these contents introspectively available. 
Finally, David Pears takes up issues about the relation between 
rationality and the nature of the subjects of belief. A particularly inter 
esting sort of irrationality is the phenomenon of self-deception; in an 
earlier work,13 Pears defended an account of self-deception according 
to which it involves sub-personal centers of agency. On such a view, 
people are not the only subjects of belief; sub-personal entities can also 
have beliefs, goals, and other attitudes. In his contribution to the 
present volume, Pears addresses the nature of these sub-personal enti 
ties by exploring the nature of the contrast between his view that they 
are centers of agency and Davidson's view that, while there are indeed 
sub-systems, they are not centers of agency. Pears goes on to evaluate 
Mark Johnston's claim that the account of self-deception in terms of 
sub-personal agents is incoherent. Pears suggests that, while the sub 
systems he invokes lack some of the features of ordinary intentional 
agency, they retain enough of those features to make it plausible that 
they are indeed centers of agency. 
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NOTES 
1 
Compare the similar approach offered by Stephen Stich in 'Reflective Equilibrium, 
Analytic Epistemology and the Problem of Cognitive Diversity' (Synthese 74 (1988), 
pp. 391-413), and discussed in Steven Luper-Foy, 'Rational Definitions and Defining 
Rationality' (in J. H. Fetzer, D. Shatz and G. Schlesinger (eds.), Definitions and Defin 
ability: Philosophical Perspectives, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1991, pp. 
203-19. 
2 
For one example of such an approach see Gilbert Harman's Change in View: Principles 
of Reasoning (MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 1986), and the discussion of some of his views 
in Steven Luper-Foy, 'Arbitrary Reasons' (in M. D. Roth and G. Ross (eds.), Doubting, 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1990, pp. 39-55). 3 
See especially Richard Foley, 'Is it Possible to Have Contradictory Beliefs?' (Midwest 
Studies in Philosophy 10 (1986), pp. 327-55). In his contribution to this collection, 
Curtis Brown argues that Ruth Barcan Marcus's views also have this as an unintended 
consequence. 4 
Scott Soames, 'Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes, and Semantic Content' (in 
N. Salmon and S. Soames (eds.), Propositions and Attitudes, Oxford University Press, 
New York, 1988). 5 
Soames shows that similar consequences also follow from more fine-grained accounts 
of the circumstances with respect to which sentences are true or false, for example, 
accounts according to which they are situations in the sense of Barwise and Perry (Situ 
ations and Attitudes, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 1983). 6 
Ruth Barcan Marcus, 'A Proposed Solution to a Puzzle About Belief (Midwest Studies 
in Philosophy 6 (1981), pp. 501-10); 'Rationality and Believing the Impossible' (Journal 
of Philosophy 80 (1983), pp. 321-38); and 'Some Revisionary Proposals About Belief 
and Believing' (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50, Supplement (1990), pp. 
133-53). Richard Foley defends a similar view in 'Is it Possible to Have Contradictory 
Beliefs?' cited above. This piece is criticized in Curtis Brown, 'How to Believe the 
Impossible' (Philosophical Studies 58 (1990), pp. 271-85). 7 
Since her argument involves the role of an assumption of rationality in the attribution 
of belief, one might see a family resemblance between Marcus's argument and Davidson's 
arguments that a kind of principle of charity makes massive error impossible. See, e.g., 
Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984, 
especially Essays 13 and 14). 8 
The relation between rationality and the attribution of content is also addressed in a 
very interesting paper by Stephen White, 'Narrow Content and Narrow Interpretation', 
forthcoming in a collection of White's papers to be published by the MIT Press. 9 
Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth, and History (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1981, chapter one). 10 John McDowell, 'Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space' (in Philip Pettit 
and John McDowell (eds.), Subject, Thought, and Context, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1986, pp. 137-68). 11 
There are interesting parallels between this argument and that of Paul A. Boghossian, 
'Content and Self-Knowledge' (Philosophical Topics 17 (1989), pp. 5-26). 12 
"Not in the head, thus inaccessible to introspection", is clearly too fast an inference; 
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it should be noted that Tyler B?rge, while holding that content is determined by extrinsic 
factors, also holds that our thoughts are available to introspection. See Tyler B?rge, 
'Individualism and Self-Knowledge' (Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988), pp. 649-63), and 
compare Donald Davidson, 'Knowing One's Own Mind' (Proceedings and Addresses of 
the APA 60 (1987), pp. 441-58), and Robert C. Stalnaker, 'Narow Content' (in C. 
Anthony Anderson and Joseph Owens (ed.), Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content 
in Logic, Language, and Mind, Center for the Study of Language and Information, 
Stanford, 1990). l~ 
David Pears, Motivated Irrationality (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984). 
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